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Do pre-offer target stock-price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present modelbased tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about
potential takeover synergies. Rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target
runups and markups (offer value minus runup) that is greater than minus one-for-one and
inherently nonlinear. If merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup—
a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies—markups
become strictly increasing in runups. Large-sample tests support rational deal anticipation
in runups while rejecting the costly feedback loop.
JEL classification: G34
Keywords: Takeovers, offer premium, runup, markup, feedback loop

∗

Betton is at the John Molson School of Business, Concordia University, Eckbo is at the Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth College, Thompson is at the Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, and
Thorburn is at the Norwegian School of Economics. For helpful comments and discussions, we thank the Editor
(Cam Harvey), an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees, Laurent Bach, Eric de Bodt, Michael Lemmon,
Pablo Moran, and Annette Poulsen. This paper, and an early precursor entitled “Markup pricing revisited,”
also benefitted from comments received in faculty seminars at the following universities and business schools:
Aarhus, Adelaide, Arizona, Boston, Calgary, Cambridge, City University of Hong Kong, Colorado, Connecticut,
Dartmouth, Georgia, HEC Montreal, Lille, LBS, Lund, Maryland, Melbourne, Navarra, Norwegian School of
Economics, BI Norwegian School of Management, Notre Dame, Oregon, Oxford, SMU, Stavanger, Texas A&M,
Texas Tech, Tilburg, Tulane, York, and UBC. The paper was also presented at the association meetings of the
AFA, EFA, EFMA, FMA, FMAI, and the NFA, as well as at the Paris Spring Corporate Finance Conference and
the UBC Summer Finance Conference. Partial financial support from Tuck’s Lindenauer Center for Corporate
Governance is gratefully acknowledged.

Takeover bids are typically preceded by substantial target stock price runups. The literature
typically characterizes such runups as the discounted value of target deal synergies triggered
by takeover rumors. As such, the runups are exogenous to the deal and should not affect deal
terms. Yet, Schwert (1996) reports that in a sample of takeovers, the market’s valuation of
the offer itself is increasing in the runup, almost dollar for dollar. It is as if bidders increase
the offer price by the runup, which would amount to paying twice for the target’s portion of
deal-specific synergies embedded in the runup. In this paper, we develop and empirically test a
simple takeover model with rational agents that permits this type of costly feedback loop from
target runups to deal terms. Empirical evidence on whether there exists a costly feedback loop is
important for parties to takeover negotiations in particular, and for the debate on the efficiency
of the takeover mechanism in general.
Our takeover model allows us to characterize the fundamental relation between two observable variables: the runup and the subsequent offer “markup” (the offer value less the runup).
Runups are triggered by takeover signals that, importantly, inform investors about both the deal
probability and the deal-specific takeover synergies conditional on a bid. Before introducing a
costly feedback loop, we show that the basic runup-markup relation implied by rational deal
anticipation is much more complex than previously thought: while the conventional intuition is
that a dollar increase in the runup will be offset by a dollar decrease in the markup (Schwert
(1996) labels this the “substitution hypothesis”), in our model the runup-markup relation is
always greater than minus one-for-one, is inherently nonlinear, and may even be positive. Interestingly, we show that this surprising complexity relative to the conventional prediction is
driven primarily by the informativeness of our takeover signal, which causes investors to update
not only the takeover probability but also the conditional deal value.
To illustrate some of this complexity, suppose that the offer premium does not respond to
the runup (no feedback loop) and consider a takeover signal that is low. If the signal informs
investors about the takeover probability only (holding the conditional deal value constant), the
low signal implies a low runup (low deal probability) followed by a high markup (high deal
surprise, driving the low deal probability to one). Now let the takeover signal inform investors
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about conditional deal values as well, so that both the deal value and the deal probability are
increasing in the signal. A low signal now results in an even lower runup (low probability times
a low deal value). However, this low runup is followed by a low markup as the takeover bid,
while producing a high deal surprise, confirms the low anticipated deal value. So, the runup
and the markup are now both low relative to the conventional prediction. Conversely, a high
signal results in a high runup and also a higher markup than conventionally predicted since deal
synergies tend to be high.
Our assumption that the takeover signal informs investors about the level of deal synergies
also produces interesting and important implications for the runup-markup relation in the presence of our costly feedback loop: markups are now strictly increasing in the runup. Intuitively,
whatever the size of the runup caused by rational deal anticipation, the markup has to be at
least as large as the runup or the bidder has not actually paid twice for the synergies embedded
in the runup.1 Bidders are rational—agreeing to the runup transfer may reflect, for example,
time pressure to close a valuable deal. More importantly, the model takes into account the fact
that the runup transfer must be financed by the bidder’s share of total synergies, and hence the
feedback loop deters otherwise marginally profitable bidders. Since the costly runup transfer
produces a runup-markup relation that is strictly positive, the costly feedback loop hypothesis
is rejected if linear cross-sectional regression of markups on runups produce a negative slope
coefficient on the runup.
We offer large-sample tests of these and other nested model predictions, using more than
6,000 initial takeover bids for U.S. public targets in 1980 to 2008. The tests strongly reject the
existence of a costly feedback loop as defined in this paper. Importantly, the empirical tests
explicitly recognize that the sample target runups may be driven by any combination of deal
anticipation (takeover probability times conditional deal synergies) and changes in the target’s
stand-alone value. We develop an unbiased estimator for the stand-alone value change that
implements the intuition that runups of targets with higher stock price volatility should be
more likely to be driven by stand-alone value changes. Tests based on runups adjusted for the
estimated stand-alone value changes only strengthen our rejection of the costly feedback loop
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hypothesis.
Furthermore, our takeover model delivers testable implications for the correlation between
bidder and target takeover-induced stock returns. Since the takeover signal is informative about
deal synergies, and since the bidder and target firms in our model share those synergies, it
follows that bidder and target takeover-induced abnormal stock returns are positively correlated.
Specifically, greater target deal values reflected in higher measured target gains and runups
should be associated with greater bidder deal values and announcement returns, which our
empirical evidence strongly supports. Interestingly, the finding of a positive correlation between
bidder total gains and the target runup constitutes evidence that the takeover signal does indeed
inform investors about potential takeover synergies, as absent this information structure, the
predicted correlation between bidder gains and target runups is zero.
Finally, we use our model framework to motivate two additional empirical investigations.
First, we show that offer premiums change almost one-for-one with the market return over
the runup period. It appears that market-driven changes in target value, which are arguably
exogenous to the takeover synergy gains, are passed through to the target. Second, we examine
the effects of significant trades in the target shares during the runup period. We find that such
block trades tend to increase runups regardless of whether the buyer is the initial bidder or
some other investor. However, there is no evidence that the additional runup is associated with
higher offer premiums. This evidence therefore fails to support the notion that bidder toehold
purchases in the runup period, which as we show fuel target runups, also increase takeover costs.
Our paper adds to the growing empirical literature examining possible feedback loops from
market prices to corrective actions taken by bidders in takeovers. For example, Luo (2005) and
Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2008) report that negative bidder stock returns following initial bid
announcements increase the chance of subsequent bid withdrawal. It is as if bidders learn from
the information in the negative market reaction and in some cases decide to abandon further
merger plans. We do not pursue this issue here as our empirical tests are not impacted by a
decision to abandon after the initial offer has been made. However, our findings suggest that
the chance of abandonment will be lower for targets with relatively large pre-bid runups, since
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these targets likely represent deals with greater total synergies to be shared with the bidder.
Also, there is an interesting indirect link between our evidence and the findings of recent
studies such as Bradley et al. (2010) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) that link takeover
activity to broad stock market movements. It appears that positive marketwide price shocks
(exogenous to takeovers) are associated with a reduction in takeover likelihood at the extensive
margin. At first, this may seem to contradict our finding that bidder gains in observed bids are
increasing in target runups. However, there is no necessary contradiction as we model synergistic
takeovers (independent of target stand-alone value changes). That is, while target runups may
deter bids driven by attempts to acquire undervalued target assets, bids driven by bidder-specific
synergy gains as modeled here remain undeterred—and possibly end up in our sample.
Furthermore, our evidence of deal anticipation in the runup is consistent with extant evidence
that target runups in observed bids tend to revert back to zero following bid rejection (Bradley,
Desai, and Kim (1983) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009)). This characterizes the
unsuccessful bids in our sample as well. The logic here is that runups that discount expected
synergy gains from a control change revert back towards zero whenever it becomes clear to
the market that the offer will fail. In contrast, if bids are primarily motivated by targets
being undervalued by the stock market, and if runups tend to correct the undervaluation, then
there is little reason for the runup to revert (perhaps other than a negative signal implied
by successful target-management resistance to the takeover attempt). The fitted forms of the
markup projection shown in this paper are generally consistent with the former but not with
the latter source of takeover gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the takeover model and
its testable implications. Section II presents the results of our main empirical tests on the
correlation between target runups and markups. Empirical results for bidder stock returns and
their correlation with target runups and markups are in Section III, while Section IV examines
effects of exogenous shocks to the target value in the runup period. Section V concludes the
paper.
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I. A Takeover Model with Rational Deal Anticipation
As empirical motivation, Figure 1 illustrates the information arrival process assumed in our
analysis, and shows the economic significance of the average target price revision for our sample
of 6,150 takeover bids (sample description follows in Section II below). The market receives
a rumor (takeover signal) causing investors to anticipate that a synergistic takeover bid will
occur with probability 0 < π ≤ 1, resulting in a target stock price runup of VR . In Figure 1,
VR averages a significant 7% when measured as the abnormal target stock return over the two
months prior to the first public offer announcement. Unadjusted for market movements, VR
averages 10%.
The subsequent (surprise) offer announcement leads to a second target price revision or
“markup” of VP − VR , where VP is the market’s valuation of the target’s deal value conditional
on the offer announcement. In the following, we refer to VP as “the conditional target deal
value” or just the “target deal value.” In Figure 1, the markup averages 22% when estimated
as the target abnormal stock return over the three-day offer announcement period (from day -1
through day +1).
Below, we model the relation between the runup VR and the markup VP − VR . We begin
in Section I.A with a baseline model that abstracts from the possibility of a costly feedback
loop from runups to deal terms. Such a feedback loop is subsequently introduced in Section I.B.
In Section I.C, we derive testable implications of our information structure and rational deal
anticipation for the relation between bidder and target takeover gains. The central empirical
predictions, which are nested within the same theoretical framework, are summarized in Table
I at the beginning of Section II.

A. The Baseline Takeover Model
We normalize to zero both the prior takeover probability and the target stock price before
the market receives a takeover signal (so VR and VP are in dollar terms). Let S denote the dollar
value of total synergies created by the takeover; S is known to the bidder and target negotiators
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Figure
1
here

but not to outside investors, who only receive a signal s about S. Based on this takeover signal,
investors update their prior information to form the posterior probability distribution G(S|s)
with density g(S|s). Moreover, we assume that higher signals s shift G(S|s) to the right so that
dE(S|s, bid)/ds > 0.2
The takeover negotiations split the synergies between bidder and target firms using a known
sharing rule θ ∈ (0, 1), where the bidder receives θS. The bidder bears a known bidding cost
C and will bid only if S > K, where K ≡ C/θ is the bid threshold (minimum synergy level to
rationally make a bid). Bidding costs may include things like advisory fees and litigation risk,
as well as any opportunity cost of expected synergy gains from a better business combination
than the target under consideration. The target receives B(S) ≡ (1 − θ)S from a takeover, with
B(S) = 0 if there is no takeover (and so S = 0). The assumption that S > 0 only if there is a
target control change (a takeover) is supported by evidence on unsuccessful targets both in our
sample and in the extant literature (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)).
Let B ≡ E(B(S)|s, bid) denote the expected target synergy gains conditional on the signal
and the bid. Since the target stand-alone value does not change during the runup period, the
target deal value is VP = B. This market value accounts for any remaining uncertainty, at the
time of the initial bid, about the synergy realization from eventual merger consummation. As
the market receives the takeover signal, it capitalizes VP , yielding the runup
Z

∞

VR =

B(S)g(S|s)dS = πVP ,

(1)

K

where the takeover probability is given by
Z

∞

π = P rob(S > K) =

g(S|s)dS.

(2)

K

This shows clearly that the takeover signal s impacts the runup positively through the implied
probability π and through the deal value VP , sice dVP /ds has the same sign as dE(S|s, bid)/ds.
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Likewise, the signal jointly impacts the markup,

VP − VR = (1 − π)VP ,

(3)

but the markup is impacted positively through VP and negatively through (1 − π).
Figure 2 illustrates these valuation functions under uniform uncertainty, S|s ∼ U (s − ∆, s +
∆), with density g(S|s) = 1/(2∆) and parameter values θ = 0.5, C = 0.5, and ∆ = 4. The
closed forms of the nonlinear functions in the figure, including proof that it reaches a maximum,
are shown in the Appendix. Rational bidding requires s > K −∆ for a bid to occur with positive
probability, which is the starting value for s along the horizontal axis in Figure 2, Panel A.
Beginning with the target deal value VP , it increases linearly with s after a minimum value
of (1 − θ)K when s just exceeds K − ∆. Note that this minimum value is increasing in C
because, with rational bidders, feasible bids must produce sufficient synergies to cover bidding
costs. Given a low signal s, if C = 0, the minimum value of VP is small as S tends to be close
to zero in observed bids. Conversely, a high C cuts off low-value bidders, which increases the
conditional expected value of S|s and therefore the minimum value of VP .
Next, the runup VR = πVP starts at zero and increases in a convex fashion with the signal. At
low signals, VR is close to zero because bidders are near indifferent to making offers (both π and
VP are low), while higher signals mean both higher deal probabilities and greater conditional deal
values. The markup function VP − VR is highly nonlinear and concave for K − ∆ < s ≤ K + ∆,
where 0 < π ≤ 1. Because K < ∆ in the figure, the markup reaches a maximum at s = 0, and
with the uniform distribution declines to zero when s > K + ∆.3
Intuitively, for low signal values, the markup is low because the deal announcement tends
to confirm the low target deal value VP anticipated by the market. As the signal increases,
the positive effect on the deal value VP initially dominates the negative effect of the signal on
the deal surprise 1 − π, causing the markup to increase with the signal strength. Following the
inflexion point (for s = 0), the reverse happens: the decline in deal surprise from greater signal
values dominates the increase in deal value, and the markup decreases in the signal.4
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To make this theory testable, we transform the unobservable signal s to the observable
runup VR . This transformation is possible because both VP and VR are monotonic in s and have
inverses. Combining equations (1) and (3) yields what we refer to as the “markup projection”:

VP − VR =

1−π
VR .
π

(4)

This pricing relation is a direct implication of rational deal anticipation (market efficiency): it
adjusts for the takeover probability π so as to hold for observed bids. Also, the form of equation
(4) is general in that it does not depend on the form of the target benefit function B(S), the
size of the threshold value K, or the distributional properties of S|s.
Moreover, the form of equation (4) is also preserved if we add a known target stand-alone
value change of T dollars over the runup period that is exogenous to the takeover process. In
that case, the bidder raises the offer by T (so the target receives T regardless of whether a bid
occurs) without reducing bidder synergy gains. Equation (4) remains unchanged except that T
must now be subtracted from the observed runup on the right-hand side in order to isolate VR
(the portion of the observed runup related to takeover synergies only).5
The markup projection in (4) clarifies an important assumption implicit in traditional linear regression tests for deal anticipation in runups (as in Schwert (1996)). Write the markup
projection using the linear form
VP − VR = a + bVR ,

(5)

where a and b are regression constants. The traditional prediction is b = −1: a dollar increase
in runup is offset by a dollar decrease in markup. Equating (5) and (4), and replacing VR with
πVP , yields
a
1
−1=
+ b.
π
πVP

(6)

Equation 6 says that for the markup projection to be linear with b = −1, it must also be the
case that VP = a. In other words, the traditional test requires that the target deal value is crosssectionally constant. In terms of the information environment, this is equivalent to assuming
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that the takeover signal received by the market in the runup period is uninformative about the
takeover synergies created by the deal (and so dVP /ds = 0).
Proposition 1 identifies an important, empirically testable restriction on the linear slope
coefficient b when VP is not constant and the general markup projection holds:

PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds. When the takeover signal causes
the market to infer different takeover probabilities and conditional deal values across a sample of
takeovers (dπ/ds > 0 and dVP /ds > 0), then the linear regression (5) produces a slope coefficient
b that is strictly greater than -1.

Proof: The derivative of the markup projection (4) w.r.t the signal s is6
d
ds (1 − π)VP
d
ds πVP

=

dVP
−VP dπ
ds + (1 − π) ds
dVP
VP dπ
ds + π ds

=

−(A1 + A2 ) +
A1 + A2

dVP
ds

> −1,

(7)

dVP
where A1 ≡ VP dπ
ds and A2 ≡ π ds . Since dVP /ds > 0 and dπ/ds > 0 over the range where

VP > 0 and 0 < π < 1, both A1 and A2 are positive.
Figure 2, Panel B illustrates how the markup varies with the runup when the distribution
of S|s is uniform (the solid curve) as well as normal (broken curve, scaled to have the same
mean deviation). The slope of the markup projection is clearly nonconstant when 0 < π < 1.
The intuition for this nonlinearity is analogous to that presented for Figure 2, Panel A above.
The slope at the left-hand tail again depends on the bidding costs C. Because K < ∆ in the
figure (bid costs are low relative to the synergy uncertainty), the slope starts positive for low
VR and reaches a maximum before trending negative. The slope at the right-hand tail drops
towards zero because the deal probability approaches one (and becomes zero with the uniform
distribution but not with the normal uncertainty as the probability never reaches one).7
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B. The Markup Projection with Costly Feedback Loop
In this section we introduce a costly feedback loop from target runups to deal terms. The
feedback loop means that the bidder transfers the runup to the target through a higher offer
price. The target valuation conditional on the offer is now
∗

VP∗ = B + VR∗ ,

(8)

∗

where B ≡ E ∗ (B(S)|s, bid) and the superscript * indicates values computed using the new bid
threshold K ∗ ≡ (C + VR∗ )/θ > K. The runup transfer (the second term in equation (8)) must be
financed from the bidder’s net takeover gains. As illustrated below, relative to the case without
a costly feedback loop, the higher bid threshold K ∗ lowers the takeover probability and increases
the target deal value conditional on a bid.
Using (8), the feedback loop implies a runup of
VR∗ = π ∗ VP∗ =

π∗
∗
B
∗
1−π

(9)

and a markup of
∗

VP∗ − VR∗ = B .

(10)

That is, the markup equals the conditional target deal value itself. The intuition is simple:
the markup now consists of the surprise target deal value (as before) plus the surprise runup
transfer, which sum to the total deal value.8
Figure 3, Panel A illustrates the runup and markup with costly feedback loop as functions
of the signal s, again assuming a uniform distribution for S|s and with parameter values as
in Figure 2. As before, the runup is increasing over the range of the takeover signal s. More
importantly, now the markup is also increasing over the entire signal range. As the runup
increases with s, offers where bidder net synergy gains become too small to finance the runup
transfer are eliminated or withdrawn, causing the conditional target deal value VP∗ to increase.
Figure 3, Panel A also plots the probability π ∗ (right vertical axis). Since K ∗ > K, it follows
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that π ∗ < π for all values of s. This lowering of the deal probability is quite dramatic: when
s = K + ∆, which is a signal value that in Figure 2, Panel A produces a certain bid, π ∗ = 0.37
in Figure 3, Panel A.
Also, since the runup transfer must be financed from the bidder’s portion of the takeover
gains, π ∗ must be less than θ. To see why, note that the bidder gains with a runup transfer is
∗

θS − C − VR∗ . Let S ≡ E ∗ (S|s, bid). The condition for positive expected bidder net gains is
∗

θS − C −

π∗
∗
(1 − θ)S > 0,
∗
1−π

which reduces to

(11)

∗

π∗ <

θS − C
∗

S −C

.

(12)

As s → ∞, the right-hand side of equation (12) converges towards θ (which has a value of 0.5
in Figure 3, Panel A).

PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds. When merger negotiations force
rational bidders to raise the offer price with the runup (costly feedback loop), the markup becomes
a positive and monotonic function of the runup, and the linear markup regression (5) yields a
positive slope coefficient (b > 0).

Proof: Since the markup projection (4) also holds for the case with a costly feedback loop,
we can write
VP∗ − VR∗ =

1 − π∗ ∗
VR .
π∗

For the slope to be positive, d(VP∗ − VR∗ )/ds and dVR∗ /ds must have the same sign. Since B is
∗

increasing in S and E ∗ (S) increases in s, it is straightforward that d(VP∗ −VR∗ )/ds = dB /ds > 0.
Moreover, using (9) we have that
∗

∗

dVR∗
B
dπ ∗
π ∗ dB
=
+
.
ds
(1 − π ∗ )2 ds
1 − π ∗ ds
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(13)

Using Leibnitz rule and noting that dK ∗ /ds = (1/θ)(dVR∗ /ds),
dπ ∗
=
ds

Z

∞

g 0 (S|s)dS −

K∗

g(K ∗ ) dVR∗
,
θ
ds

(14)

where g 0 (S|s) is the first derivative of g(S|s). Substituting (14) into (13) and rearranging yields
# "
#
"
Z ∞
∗
∗
∗
dVR∗
π ∗ dB
B
B g(K ∗ )
0
g (S|s)ds +
/ 1+
> 0.
=
ds
(1 − π ∗ )2 K ∗
1 − π ∗ ds
(1 − π ∗ )2 θ

(15)

Figure 3, Panel B plots the markup projection with a costly runup transfer, again for the
uniform case (the shape is similar if we instead assume normal uncertainty). In contrast to
Figure 2, Panel B, where the markup falls after reaching a maximum value, the markup in
Figure 3, Panel B is monotonically increasing in the runup, approaching a near-linear form
for low values of VR . It is therefore straightforward that the costly feedback loop hypothesis
is rejected if a linear markup regression produces a statistically significant negative slope in a
sample of takeovers.

C. Deal Anticipation and Bidder Returns
Finally, we turn to the relation between bidder and target valuations in our model. As for
targets, the bidder stock price is normalized to zero prior to the runup period. Given the sharing
rule 0 < θ < 1, and abstracting from a costly feedback loop, greater total synergies S result in
greater bidder gains A = θS − C. The takeover signal results in a runup in the bidder’s market
value, and a subsequent bid further raises this market value as bid uncertainty is resolved. Let
νP denote the market’s valuation of the bidder conditional on the bid: νP ≡ E(A(S)|s, bid).
With no change in the bidder stand-alone values during the runup period, we have that
1
νP =
π

Z

∞

A(S)g(S|s)dS.

(16)

K

PROPOSITION 3: (i) Suppose the takeover signal causes the market to infer different takeover
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probabilities and conditional deal values across a sample of takeovers (dπ/ds > 0 and dVP /ds >
0). Absent a costly feedback loop, rational market deal anticipation implies Cov(A, B) > 0 and
Cov(A, VR ) > 0. (ii) If the takeover signal is uninformative about deal values (dπ/ds > 0 and
dVP /ds = 0), then Cov(A, VR ) = 0 absent a costly feedback loop, and Cov(A, VR ) < 0 in the
presence of a costly feedback loop.

Proof: In part (i) of the proposition: Cov(A, B) = Cov(θS −C, (1−θ)S) = θ(1−θ)V ar(S) >
0. For the sign of Cov(E < VR ), note that the observed S equals its conditional expectation
S ≡ E(S|s, bid) plus noise. Thus, Cov(A, VR ) = Cov(θS − C, (1 − θ)πS) = θ(1 − θ)Cov(S, πS).
Since both S and π are increasing in s, this covariance is positive. In part (ii) of the proposition,
consider first the case without a costly feedback loop. Since both firms share S (which is random), Cov(A, B) > 0. However, Cov(S, s) = 0 since s is uninformative about deal value and so
S does not vary with s. Thus, Cov(A, VR ) = 0. Adding a costly feedback loop, bidders transfer
more of the synergy gains to the target as anticipation increases while, by assumption, the total
expected synergy gains remain constant. Thus, gains to the bidder decrease on average with
increasing target runups: Cov(A, VR ) < 0.9
We now turn to a large-scale empirical analysis of the above propositions and related hypotheses.

II. Testing for Deal Anticipation and Costly Feedback Loop
A. Empirical Test Strategy
Table I summarizes the central empirical hypotheses nested within the rational deal anticipation framework developed above. The first column repeats the theoretical form of the economic
model, while the second and third columns describe the associated econometric model and (a
total of 11) empirical tests. We begin with the baseline deal anticipation hypothesis (Proposition
1), which states that, under deal anticipation, the predicted value of the linear slope coefficient
is b > −1. Moreover, the general markup function (4) is inherently nonlinear, as illustrated in
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Figure 2, Panel B. We explore the presence of nonlinearities using a flexible functional form (the
beta function), and perform several goodness-of-fit tests for nonlinearity against the hypothesis
that the markup projection is linear.
The estimates of the linear slope coefficient b provide a direct test of the costly feedback
loop hypothesis, which predicts that the markup should be increasing everywhere in the runup
(Proposition 2). A statistically significant negative slope coefficient in the linear markup regression would therefore constitute a powerful rejection of the existence of our costly feedback loop
hypothesis. Combining Propositions 1 and 2, finding −1 < b ≤ 0 simultaneously would reject
the existence of a costly feedback loop while supporting rational deal anticipation in runups.
While not modeled explicitly in Section I, the empirical analysis also addresses the possibility
of a change of T dollars (positive or negative) in the target’s stand-alone value during the runup
period. The presence of a known T does not affect the above theory. However, it attenuates
the slope coefficient and reduces power to detect nonlinearities in the runup-markup relation
implied by the synergy component itself. More specifically, while T does not affect the markup
(as the difference between the premium and the runup automatically nets out T ), it introduces
an errors-in-variables problem in the runup. We therefore develop an estimator for T that
allows us to subtract the estimated value of T from the observed total runup, and repeat the key
empirical tests with the adjusted runup (the estimated synergy component) as the independent
variable.
Rational deal anticipation and rational bidding further imply that bidder takeover gains
are related in specific ways to the target gains and runup (Proposition 3). The predictions in
Proposition 3 are tested using linear regressions of νP on VP and VR . Under alternative (i) in
the proposition, the linear slope of both these target valuations is predicted to be positive. In
part (ii), however, which assumes that the takeover signal is uninformative about deal synergies
(the information structure implicit in the extant literature, as discussed in equation (6) above),
the predicted linear slope coefficient on VR is zero absent a costly feedback loop and negative in
the presence of a costly feedback loop.
The empirical analysis also examines (in Section IV) two additional linear regression spec-
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ifications that address potential offer price effects of known shocks to the target runup. The
first is the (exogenous) market return over the runup period, and the second is a major block
trade in the target shares such as a bidder toehold purchase. We test whether either of these
two factors fuel target runups and, if so, if they result in increased offer prices.

B. Characteristics of the Takeover Sample
As summarized in Table II, we sample control bids from SDC using transaction form “merger”
or “acquisition of majority interest,” requiring the target to be publicly traded and U.S. domiciled. The sample period is January 1980 to December 2008. In a control bid, the buyer owns
less than 50% of the target shares prior to the bid and seeks to own at least 50% of the target
equity.
We group bids into takeover contests. A takeover contest may have multiple bidders, several
bid revisions by a single bidder, or a single control bid. The initial control bid is the first control
bid for the target in six months. All control bids announced within six months of an earlier
control bid belong to the same contest. The contest ends when there are no new control bids
for the target over a six-month period or the target is delisted. This definition results in 13,893
takeover contests. We then require that targets (i) are listed on NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ, (ii)
have at least 100 days of common stock return data in CRSP over the estimation period (day
-297 through day -43), (iii) have total market equity capitalization exceeding $10 million on day
-42, (iv) have a stock price exceeding $1 on day -42, (v) have an offer price in SDC, (vi) have a
stock price in CRSP on day -2, (vii) have an announcement return for the window [-1,+1], (viii)
have information on the outcome and ending date of the contest, and (ix) have a contest length
of 252 trading days (one year) or less. The final sample has 6,150 control contests.
Approximately three-quarters of the control bids are merger offers and 10% are followed by a
bid revision or competing offer from a rival bidder. The frequency of tender offers and multiplebid contests is higher in the first half of the sample period. The initial bidder wins control of
the target in two-thirds of the contests, with a higher success probability towards the end of the
sample period. One-fifth of the control bids are horizontal. A bid is horizontal if the target and
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acquirer have the same four-digit SIC code in CRSP or, when the acquirer is private, the same
four-digit SIC code in SDC. Based on the major four-digit SIC code of the target, approximately
one-third of the sample targets are in manufacturing industries, one-quarter are in the financial
industry, and one-quarter are service companies. The remaining targets are spread over natural
resources, trade, and other industries.
Table III shows average premiums, markups, and runups, both annually and for the total
sample. The initial offer premium is

OP
P−42

− 1, where OP is the initial offer price and P−42 is

the target stock closing price or, if missing, the bid-ask average on trading day −42, adjusted
for splits and dividends. The bid is announced on day 0. Offer prices are from SDC. The offer
premium averages 45% for the total sample, with a median of 38%. Offer premiums were highest
in the 1980s when the frequency of tender offers and hostile bids was also greater, and lowest
after 2003.
The next two columns show the total markup,

OP
P−2

− 1, which is the ratio of the offer price to

the target stock price on day −2. The total markup is 33% for the average control bid (median
27%). The target total runup, defined as

P−2
P−42

− 1, averages 10% for the full sample (median

7%), which is roughly one-quarter of the offer premium. The last two columns of Table III show
M−2
the net runup, defined as the runup net of the average market runup ( M
− 1, where M is the
−42

value of the equal-weighted market portfolio). The net runup is 8% on average, with a median
of 5%.

C. Estimating the Markup Projections using Offer Prices
Table IV shows the results of estimating the markup projection for our sample of 6,150 initial
takeover bids. For each model, the table shows the constant term and slope from estimating the
baseline linear markup projection, along with three test statistics for nonlinearity. All estimates
are produced using the beta distribution, denoted Λ(v, w), where v and w are shape parameters
determined by the data:

VP j − VRj = a + b

(VRj − min)(v−1) (max − VRj )w−1
+ j ,
Λ(v, w)(max − min)v+w−1
16

j = 1, ..., N.

(17)
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Here, max and min are, respectively, the maximum and minimum VR in the data, a is an overall
intercept, b is a scale parameter, and j is a residual error term. The estimated shape parameters
v and w determine whether the beta density suggests the projection is concave, convex, peaked
at the left, right, or both tails, unimodal with the hump toward the right or left, or linear. A
least squares fit over all four parameters allows the data to find a best nonlinear shape using
the beta density. If the parameters are constrained to v = 1 and w = 2 or vice versa, a least
squares fit (allowing a and b to vary) produces an a and b that replicate the intercept and slope
coefficient in a linear (OLS) regression (reported in Table IV).
Beginning with the first hypothesis in Table I (linear slope b > −1 and nonlinearity), recall
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that Figure 2, Panel B suggests a unimodal fit with the hump to the left and the right tail
declining towards zero as the takeover signal increases and deals become increasingly certain.
Figure 4, Panel A plots our sample total runups and total markups as defined in model (1) of
Table IV using three alternative estimated functions: (i) the best linear fit (constrained to have
v = 1 and w = 2 or vice versa), (ii) the best nonlinear monotone fit (constrained to have v ≤ 1),
and (iii) the best nonlinear fit (unconstrained) of the markup on the runup.
The unconstrained empirical fit in Figure 4, Panel A is quite similar to the theoretical shapes
in Figure 2, Panel B. The hump to the left in Figure 4, Panel A is driven by a subset of takeovers
with low runups. Takeovers of poorly performing targets are not uncommon—about one-third
of the sample runups are negative—reflecting negative changes in the target’s stand-alone value
during the runup period. We return to an adjustment for negative runups in Section II.D below.
The last three columns in Table IV show three goodness-of-fit likelihood ratio (LR) test
statistics applied to the data in Figure 4, Panel A. The likelihood ratio is calculated as
N

2
SSE(constrained model)
LR = SSE(unconstrained
, where SSE is the sum of squared errors for the constrained
model)
and the unconstrained model specifications, and N is the sample size. For large samples,
−2ln(LR) ∼ χ2 (d), where d is the number of model restrictions (Theil (1971), p. 396). We
have verified that this likelihood ratio test statistic shows close correspondence to a χ2 distribution near the 1% significance level when using simulated linear markups with normal errors.
Of the three LR statistics in Table IV, the first, LR1, tests for nonlinearity against the
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alternative of a linear form (d = 2). The second, LR2, tests nonlinearity against monotonicity
(d = 1). The third, LR3 ≡ LR1 − LR2, tests monotonicity against linearity (d = 1). The
1% critical value for LR1 is 9.2, while for LR2 and LR3 it is 6.6. With the exception of LR3
for models (3) and (4) in Table IV, where runups and markups are measured using cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) rather than offer prices, all the reported LR values substantially
exceed their respective 1% cutoff points. All the LR1 values across all the models strongly
reject linearity in favor of the unrestricted nonlinear form. Moreover, all the LR2 values reject
monotonicity in favor of nonmonotonicity. Finally, with the exception of models (3) and (4),
the LR3 values also reject linearity against monotonicity.
The results of the linear regressions in Table IV are important. Recall from Proposition 1
that the baseline deal anticipation hypothesis predicts a linear slope coefficient of b > −1. The
estimated slope coefficients reported in Table IV have values that are significantly greater than
-1, with the exception of model (2) where b = −1.01 (discussed further below). For example, the
estimated slope coefficient for model (1) is -0.24, which has a t-statistic of -11.9 against zero and
(not reported) a t-statistic of 37.7 against −1. Moreover, the slope coefficient estimates across
all seven models are negative and significantly different from zero. This evidence simultaneously
rejects our costly feedback loop hypothesis, where the bidder pays twice for the portion of target
runup caused by anticipation of takeover synergies (i.e., b > 0), and supports the hypothesis
that runups reflect rational deal anticipation.

D. Adjusting Runups for Target Stand-Alone Value Changes
In this section, we consider the effect of adding a stand-alone value change of Tj dollars
(positive or negative) to the value of target j in the runup period. The stand-alone value change
Tj represents an exogenous change in the value of the target resources in their second-best
use. While unobservable to the econometrician, we assume that Tj is known to the negotiators,
perhaps inferred from secondary market trading in the target shares during the runup period.
Since Tj does not impact the synergy Sj or the takeover probability πj , Tj is neither a source of
takeover gains in our model nor a takeover cost if transferred to the target. Thus, the incentive
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to bid continues to be driven by bidder net synergies only.
Let VRj denote a runup that includes Tj 6= 0. Assuming the runup flows through to the
target (at zero cost to the bidder), we have that

VRj = πB j + Tj ,

(18)

where πB j ≡ πj E(Bj (S)|s, bid). Our empirical results above (model (1) in Table IV and Figure
4, Panel A) show that the nonlinearity predicted by the deal anticipation component πB j appears
in the data even without adjusting for sample variation in Tj . Nevertheless, we are interested in
whether isolating πB j in the data improves the nonlinear empirical fit of the markup projection
in Figure 4, Panel A. In particular, subtracting an estimate of Tj from VRj should increase test
power when VRj is negative since, in our model, VRj < 0 means that Tj < 0 and is greater
in magnitude than the positive πB j . In our sample, the total runup is negative in 31% of the
sample bids (in 37% when we estimate the runup using CARs), perhaps driven by relatively
poor target operating performance and/or financial distress.
Assume that E(Tj ) is cross-sectionally constant and equal to zero. (A nonzero value of E(Tj )
would shift the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) estimates below by a constant and thus
preserve their cross-sectional properties. Moreover, when measuring runups using CARs, that is
when netting out price movements due to systematic risk, market efficiency implies E(Tj ) = 0
unconditionally). Given observations on the total runup VRj , the following constitutes a BLUE
for Tj :
E(Tj |VRj ) = αj + βj VRj .

(19)

Since Tj is uncorrelated with the synergy gains, the slope coefficient is

βj =

Cov(Tj , VRj )
V ar(Tj )
=
,
V ar(VRj )
V ar(Tj ) + V ar(πB j )

and the intercept term is αj = −βj E(VRj ).
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(20)

The BLUE estimate of the partial anticipation component πB j becomes

c = V − E(T |V ) = (1 − β )V + β E(V ).
πB
j
j Rj
j Rj
j
Rj
Rj

(21)

This estimator—also referred to below as Adjusted runup—nets out an unbiased estimate of Tj
from the observed VRj . The adjustment implements the idea that a higher observed runup likely
has a higher Tj , but not on a one-for-one basis as V ar(πB j ) > 0 implies βj < 1 in equation (20).
Moreover, βj is smaller the smaller is V ar(Tj ) relative to V ar(πB j ). Thus, when computing the
adjusted runup in equation (21), the smaller is V ar(Tj ) relative to V ar(πB j ), the more (less)
weight is placed on the observed runup VRj (E(VRj )).
The BLUE estimator requires estimation of the parameters E(VRj ), V ar(Tj ), and V ar(πB j ).
Since E(Tj ) = 0, equation (18) implies that E(VRj ) = E(πB j ), which we estimate as the crosssectional average observed runup V R . We estimate the runup two ways: as the total runup
[(p−2 /p−42 ) − 1] and as the target’s CAR(-41,-2) (the CAR estimation uses the market model;
see details in Section II.E below). In our sample, V R = 9.8% when based on the total runup,
and 7.3% when based on the CAR runup.
Second, V ar(Tj ) is estimated as V ar[CARj (−81, −42)], defined as the time-series variance of the target’s CAR over the 40-day pre-runup period from day -81 through day -42;
V ar[CARj (−81, −42)] reflects the time-series variability of Tj without being contaminated by
V ar(B j ). Assuming time-series independence in the daily abnormal stock returns, V ar[CARj (−81, −42)]
is estimated as the variance of the daily abnormal stock return times 40.
Finally, we estimate V ar(πB) as V ar[CAR(−41, −2)]−V ar[CAR(−81, −42)], the difference
in the cross-sectional CAR variances over the runup period and the pre-runup period. This
difference in variances captures the notion that signals of synergy gains add variability to the
cross-section of total runups relative to an equivalent period that is not influenced by realizations
of s. In our sample, when estimated this way, V ar(πB) is 24% of the average estimate of V ar(Tj )
described above.
Combining these estimates produces an average estimated β in equation (20) of 0.77, with
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a minimum of 0.74 and a maximum of 0.99. Using the β estimates to adjust the runups in
equation (21) successfully pulls in the tails of the runup data: when we use the total runup, the
minimum runup increases from -83% to -12% and the maximum drops from 244% to 67%. The
percentage of negative runups falls from a third of the sample to less than 3% of the sample
(146 cases). Within our model, these observations contain negative estimation error despite the
adjustment.
The results of the linear and nonlinear fits using the adjusted total runups are shown as
model (2) in Table IV and plotted in Figure 4, Panel B. Because we are reducing the spread in
runups, the linear slope is accentuated, at -1.01, strongly negative and insignificantly different
from -1. This estimate is sensitive to our estimate of β in the adjustment model, and the
other two model estimates with adjustments (models (4) and (7)) produce linear slopes that are
significantly greater than -1 as predicted. It is also interesting that the adjustment in model (2)
improves the nonlinear fit over model (1): Figure 4, Panel B shows a definite hump in the left
portion of the runups, and the LR1 and LR2 test statistics are considerably higher at 125.6 and
64.5, respectively.
Our BLUE estimator provides an interesting interpretation of how the components Tj and
B j may be varying in the cross-section of observed runups. First, the amount of T in the average
deal, which has a total runup of about 10%, is zero (the entire 10% reflects average anticipation
of deal synergies). Second, deals with greater than average runups experience a positive standalone value change in the runup period, where Tj is estimated using βj (VRj −E(VRj )) in equation
(21). Conversely, deals with runups of less than 10% experience Tj < 0 in the runup period.

E. The Markup Projection Estimated using CARs
While our main empirical analysis uses offer premiums to measure markups, in this section
we instead define markups using CARs in response to the takeover bid announcement. This
provides a link back to the work of Schwert (1996), who also uses CARs to estimate markups.
In models (3) and (4) in Table IV, CAR is estimated using the market model, where the runup
is CAR(-41,-2) and the markup is CAR(-1,1). While Schwert (1996) employs a long event
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window to measure markups, from day 0 through day 126 relative to the offer announcement,
we prefer the shorter window (-1,1) to minimize the effect on the markup estimate of subsequent
takeover-related events, including bid revisions and withdrawal information. The parameters of
the market model are estimated on stock returns from day -297 through day -42, and the CAR
uses the model prediction errors over the event period.
Like Schwert (1996), model (3) makes no adjustment in the CAR for target stand-alone value
changes (T ) in the runup period beyond that achieved by subtracting the influence of market
movements on target stock returns. In model (4), however, as in model (2), we subtract an
estimate of T using our BLUE estimator in equation (19). The fitted form of model (4) is shown
in Figure 5.
Although the measurement error in CAR lowers test power, the likelihood ratio test statistics
LR1 and LR2 again strongly reject linearity, in both models (3) and (4). According to LR3, the
best monotone fit is now indistinguishable from the linear fit (that is, if we do not allow the fit to
permit a hump, the model is almost linear), a result not critical for our deal anticipation theory.
Interestingly, the nonlinear fit is significantly enhanced by the adjustment for the target standalone value change in model (4). This is also reflected in the linear slope coefficient going from
-0.09 in model (3) to -0.39 in model (4), suggesting a substantially greater degree of substitution
on average between runups and markups when we isolate the deal synergy component in the
runup, as our theory predicts.
In sum, empirical models (1) to (4) in Table IV support the presence of deal anticipation in
target runups, while at the same time rejecting the hypothesis that merger negotiations force
bidders to systematically raise offer prices with the runup. This conclusion fails to support the
view that target runups increase bidder takeover costs in observed takeover bids.

F. Robustness
In this section, we report the results of two robustness checks on model (1) in Table IV. The
first check, implemented in models (5) and (6), adjusts the offer price markup for an estimate of
the bid success probability given the bid announcement. The second robustness check, in model
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(7), adds information available to the market prior to the runup period, which may help predict
takeovers.

F.1. The Probability of Bid Success
When estimating the deal value VP using offer premiums, the estimate does not account for
the probability that the offer will ultimately be accepted by target shareholders. Some bids fail,
in which case the target receives zero premium. Presumably, the market reaction to the bid
adjusts for an estimate of the probability of an ultimate control change. This is apparent from
Figure 1 where the target stock price on average runs up to just below 30% (CAR(-41,1)=29%),
while the average offer premium in Table III is 37% adjusted for the market runup. To account
for this effect, in this section we multiply the initial offer price by an estimate of the target
success probability (where target failure means that no bidder wins the contest).
The success probability is estimated using logit, where the dependent variable takes a value
of one if the target (according to the SDC) is ultimately acquired either by the initial bidder or
a rival bidder, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table V and the
results of the logit estimation are reported in the first two columns of Table VI.
The logit regressions for contest success are significant with a pseudo-R2 of 21% to 22%. The
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difference between the first and second columns is that the latter includes two dummy variables
for the 1990s and the 2000s. The probability that the takeover is successful increases significantly
with the size of the target, and is higher for public acquirers and in horizontal transactions. Bids
for targets traded on NYSE or Amex, targets with relatively high stock turnover (average daily
trading volume, defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded and the number of shares
outstanding, over days -252 to -43), and targets with a poison pill have a lower likelihood of
succeeding.
A high offer premium also tends to increase the probability of takeover success, as does a
relatively small run-down from the 52-week high target stock price. Moreover, the coefficients
on dummy variables indicating a positive bidder toehold in the target (Toehold), stock consideration exceeding 20% of the bidder’s shares outstanding and hence requiring acquirer shareholder

23

Table
VI
here

approval (>20% new equity), and a hostile (as opposed to friendly or neutral) target reaction
(Hostile) are all negative and significant. Finally, contests starting with a tender offer are more
likely to succeed, as are contests announced in the 1990s and the 2000s. The dummy variable
indicating an all-cash bid generates a significantly negative coefficient only when controlling for
the time period (column (2)).
Table VI, columns (3) to (6), also shows the coefficients from logit estimations of the probability that the initial control bidder wins the takeover contest. The pseudo-R2 is somewhat
higher for this success probability, ranging from 22% to 28%. Columns (3) and (4) use the same
models as the earlier estimations of contest success, while columns (5) and (6) add a variable
capturing the percent of target shares owned by the initial control bidder at the time of the bid
(Toehold size). Almost all explanatory variables generate coefficients that are similar in size,
direction, and significance level to those in the logit regressions of contest success. The reason
is that in the vast majority of successful contests, it is the initial bidder who wins control of the
target. The only difference between the probability estimations is that the existence of a target
poison pill does not substantially affect the likelihood that the initial bidder wins. The larger
the initial bidder toehold, however, the greater is the probability that the initial bidder wins.
There are a total of 6,103 targets with available data on the characteristics used in the
logit estimation. For each of these targets, we multiply the total markup by the estimated
success probability computed using the second model in Table VI (which includes the two decade
dummies). This expected markup is then used in models (5) and (6) reported in Table IV. Model
(5) uses the total runup, while model (6) uses the total runup adjusted using the BLUE estimator
for the target stand-alone value change.
Consistent with our baseline deal anticipation hypothesis, the linear slope coefficient estimates are negative and greater than -1 for both models. Moreover, the likelihood ratio tests
LR1 and LR2 for both models strongly reject linearity and monotonicity against nonlinearity,
while LR3 also rejects linearity against monotonicity.10
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F.2. Information Prior to the Runup Period
Up to this point, we have assumed that the market imparts a negligible likelihood of a
takeover onto the target price before the beginning of the runup period (day -41 in Figure 1).
To start the runup period around two calender months prior to the first bid is common in the
empirical takeover literature, beginning with Bradley (1980). Moreover, the large markups in
our data (on average 33%, Table III) indicate that the offer announcement is a significant news
(surprise) event. Nevertheless, in this section we check whether including information prior to
day -41 in the computation of the runup changes our empirical results.
Suppose the market has already received a signal z on event day -42. Moreover, the market
receives a second signal s during the runup period. Now, a bid is made if s+z exceeds a threshold
level of synergy gains. Working through the valuations, there is one important change. Define
V0 = π(z)E(B(S)|z) as the expected value of takeover prospects at the end of event day -42
given z and a diffuse prior on s. The runup and the bid premium are now measured relative to
V0 instead of zero,

VR − V0 = π(s + z)E(B(S)|s + z, bid) − π(z)E(B(S)|z),

(22)

and the premium is

VP − V0 = E(B(S)|s + z, bid) − π(z)E(B(S)|z) =

1
(VR − V0 ).
π(s + z)

(23)

In other words, to investigate the nonlinear influence of market anticipation prior to the runup
period, one must add back V0 to both the runup and the bid premium. Since the influence of
V0 is a negative one-for-one on both quantities, markups are not affected.
To unwind the influence of a possibly known takeover signal z prior to the runup period, we
use the following three deal characteristics defined earlier in Table V: T oehold, T oehold size,
and the negative value of 52-week high. A toehold means that at some point in the past the
bidder acquired a toehold in the target, which may have caused some market anticipation of a
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future takeover. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the signal is increasing in the size of
the toehold. Also, we know from Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) and Table IX below that the
target’s 52-week high return impacts the takeover premium.
Using these variables, model (7) in Table IV implements two multivariate adjustments to
the model baseline in row (1). The first adjustment, as dictated by equation (22), augments
−2
− 1) on T oehold,
the runup by adding R0 , where R0 is the projection of the total runup ( PP−42

T oehold size, and the negative value of 52-week high. The second adjustment is to use as the
dependent variable the “residual markup” UP , which is the residual from the projection of the
total markup,

OP
P−2

− 1, on the deal characteristics used to estimate the success probability π in

Table VI while excluding T oehold, T oehold size, and 52-week high, which are used to construct
the augmented runup.
Model (7) in Table IV shows the linear and nonlinear projections of the residual markup on
the augmented runup. The linear slope remains negative and highly significant (slope of -0.26,
t-statistics of -12.1). Thus, the costly feedback hypothesis continues to be rejected with the
augmented runups. Moreover, the three LR test statistics confirm that the goodness-of-fit of
the nonlinear form of the markup projection is significantly better than those of the linear and
the monotonic forms, and that monotonicity fits better than linearity. Overall, this evidence
further supports the presence of a deal anticipation effect in the runup measured over the runup
period.

III. Do Bidders Share in Total Synergy Gains?
Proposition 3, as summarized in Table I above, states that when the takeover signal informs
investors about deal synergies (dVP /ds > 0), and the bidder and target share in the takeover
gains, total bidder gains are positively correlated with both target total gains (Cov(A, B) > 0)
and the target runup (Cov(A, VR ) > 0). Intuitively, rational market anticipation of shared
takeover gains increases the stock prices of both bidders and targets. Alternatively, if we restrict the takeover signal to be uninformative about deal synergies (dVP /ds = 0), rational deal
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anticipation implies Cov(A, VR ) = 0. Moreover, if we maintain dVP /ds = 0 and also add a
costly feedback loop, rational deal anticipation implies Cov(A, VR ) < 0.
We test these predictions using the 3,691 publicly traded bidders in our sample. Our estimate
of total bidder gains, νP , is the cumulative abnormal bidder stock return (BCAR) from event
day -41 through the day following the first public bid announcement, BCAR(-41,1). As for
the target CAR analysis in Section II.E above, the estimation of BCAR uses a market model
regression estimated over the period from day -297 through day -42 relative to the initial offer
announcement date.
We examine the relation between BCAR(-41,1) and target total gains and runups in two
ways. First, Figure 6 shows the functional form when BCAR(-41,1) is projected on the target
runup using the nonlinear form (equation (17)). Here, the target runup is CAR(-41,-2) in
Figure 6, Panel A, and is Adjusted CAR(−41, −2) in Figure 6, Panel B, where the target runup
adjustment uses the BLUE estimator from Section II.D for target stand-alone value changes.
Second, we estimate the slope coefficients in multivariate linear regressions of BCAR on target
gains and alternative definitions of the target runup, reported in Table VII.
As is well known, bidder announcement returns are noisy (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn
(2008)). In our sample, BCAR(-41,1) averages a statistically insignificant -1.5%. From Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) we also know that bidder announcement returns are unusually
negative in the two-year period 1999 to 2000. In our sample, BCAR(-41,1) averages a significant
-4.7% across our 529 observations from these two years. Thus, we add an intercept dummy for
1999 to 2000 to our set of control variables in the cross-sectional regressions with BCAR(-41,1)
as the dependent variable.
The empirical projections in Figure 6 are increasing and concave over the entire range of
target runups for both runup measures. The likelihood ratio tests we used for targets in Table IV
above reject linearity of the shapes in Figure 6 in favor of a nonlinear, monotonically increasing
shape. In separate analysis, we also show that the nonlinear shapes are almost identical when
BCAR(-41,1) is projected on the augmented target runup (defined earlier in Table IV) and on
target total gains CAR(-41,1).
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Turning to the linear regressions in Table VII, the key independent variables are the target
total gains and the target runup. To save space, the table suppresses the individual slope
coefficients for most of the remaining regressors referred to collectively as “control variables”
as explained in the table caption. Total target gains are estimated as the market model target
CAR(-41,1). The target runup variable is estimated in three ways: the market model CAR(41,-2), the market model adjusted CAR(-41,-2) and the net runup, defined as the target total
runup net of the market runup (P−2 /P−42 − M−2 /M−42 ).
Notice that the six intercept terms in Table VII range from -1.0% to -5.2%, while the 1999
to 2000 period indicator ranges from -3.2% to -4.1%. Inclusion of the control variables raises
the regression R2 to a high of 6%. Of the control variables, Relative size and All cash receive
significantly positive coefficients, while target share turnover (T urnover) receives a significantly
negative coefficient.
As predicted (Proposition 3), bidder gains are increasing in both total target gains and
target runups. The coefficient on Target CAR(−41, 1) is 0.101 (model (1)) and, with control
variables, 0.099 (model (2)), both highly significant. Consistent with the impression given by
the nonlinear shapes in Figure 6, the target runup receives a positive and significant coefficient
in all six models in Table VII. In model (3), which uses the market model CAR(-41,-2) as the
target runup, the coefficient on the runup is 0.149 (p-value < 0.001). With the control variables
(model (4)), the slope coefficient is a virtually unchanged 0.147. In model (5), where the target
CAR runup is adjusted for the BLUE estimator of the target stand-alone value change, the
slope coefficient is 0.649 (p-value < 0.001) with control variables. In model (6), where the target
runup is simply the net runup, the slope coefficient is 0.079, again highly significant.11
Overall, the significantly positive correlations between bidder and target gains in Figure
6 and Table VII strongly support the joint hypothesis that takeover signals inform rational
investors about potential deal synergies and that bidders and targets share in the takeover
gains. Conversely, the same evidence rejects the alternative hypothesis that the takeover signal is
uninformative about potential deal values (which, as discussed above, predicts a zero correlation
between bidder and target gains). The same evidence also rejects a second alternative hypothesis:
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that bidders systematically accept value-decreasing deals.

IV. Premium Effects of Shocks to Target Runups
In this section we examine the effect on the runup and the offer premium of target stock
price shocks during the runup period using two instruments. The first is given by significant
block trades in the target shares. The second is the market return over the runup period, which
affects the target stand-alone value. The empirical effects of these instruments complement the
analyses in Sections II and III above, examining the hypothesis that target runups reflect deal
anticipation, and whether runups are costly for bidders.

A. Target Share Block Trades (Toehold Purchases)
We identify toehold purchases using the ”acquisitions of partial interest” data item in SDC,
where the buyer seeks to own less than 50% of the target shares. As shown in Table VIII, over
the six months preceding bid announcement [-126,0], the initial control bidders in our sample
acquire a total of 136 toeholds in 122 unique target firms. Of these stakes, 104 toeholds in 94
different targets are purchased over the 42 trading days leading up to and including the day of
the announcement of the initial control bid. Thus, less than 2% of our initial control bidders
acquire a toehold in the runup period. The typical toehold acquired by the initial bidder in
the runup period is relatively large, with a mean of 12% (median 9%). Note that this evidence
on toehold acquisitions in the runup period is new to the literature as existing papers do not
distinguish toeholds held long term from those purchased shortly before the takeover bid (e.g.,
Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009)).
Also, the timing of the toehold purchase during the runup period is important for its ability
to generate takeover rumors. In our sample, two-thirds of the initial control bidders’ toehold
acquisitions in the runup period are announced on the day of or the day before the initial
control bid [-1,0]. Since the SEC allows investors 10 days to file a 13(d), these toeholds have
most likely been purchased sometime within the 10-day period preceding and including the offer
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announcement day. For these cases, the target stock price runup does not contain information
from a public Schedule 13(d) disclosure (but will of course still reflect any market microstructure
impact of the trades). The remaining short-term toeholds are all disclosed in the runup period.
We also collect toehold purchases by rival control bidders (appearing later in the contest)
and other investors. As it turns out, rival bidders acquire a toehold in the runup period for only
three target firms. The average size of these rival short-term toeholds is 7%. Other investors,
not bidding for control in the contest, acquire toeholds in 73 target firms (1% of target firms)
during the 42 days preceding the control bid. The announcement of 21% (18 of 85) of these
toeholds coincides with the announcement of the initial control bid, suggesting that rumors may
trigger toehold purchases by other investors.
Table IX reports results of regressions with the target net runup (columns (1) and (2)) and
the offer premium (columns (3) to (6)) as dependent variables. These regressions test for the
impact of toehold acquisitions in the runup period, and whether this impact in turn affects
offer premiums. The dummy variables Stake bidder and Stake other indicate toehold purchases
by the initial control bidder and any other bidder (including rivals), respectively, in the runup
window through day 0. The regressions also control for the bidder’s total toehold position at
the bid (T oehold size), which includes toeholds that the bidder has held for longer periods.
Notice that both Stake bidder and Stake other have a significant and positive impact on the
net runup. At the same time, T oehold size enters with a negative and significant sign. Thus,
only short-term toehold purchases have a positive impact on target runups.
Several of the other control variables for the target net runup in Table IX receive significant
coefficients. The smaller the target firm (T arget size) and the greater the relative drop in
the target stock price from its 52-week high (52-week high), the higher the runup. Moreover,
the runup is higher when the acquirer is publicly traded and for tender offers, and lower for
horizontal takeovers. The inclusion of year fixed effects in the second column does not change
any of the results. Also, these conclusions remain unchanged if we include a Heckman (1979)
correction for endogeneity of the toehold purchase decision (the estimated Mill’s ratio) in Table
Table
IX
here

IX.
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In columns (3) to (6) of Table IX, T oehold size receives a statistically significant and negative
coefficient in all four offer premium regressions. That is, as reported elsewhere in the literature
(Betton and Eckbo (2000), Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009)), bidders with toeholds pay
significantly lower premiums. More important for this paper, the two indicators for shortterm toehold purchases (Stake bidder and Stake other) do not affect offer premiums. An
explanation consistent with these results is that, while short-term toehold acquisitions tend to
increase runups, the negotiating parties identify this toehold effect as endogenous to the takeover
process and thus do not raise the offer in response.

B. Market Movements Over the Runup Period
In Section II.D above, we adjust the target runup for an estimate of the stand-alone value
change Tj over the runup period and estimate the markup projection using the adjusted runups.
In this section, we instead identify an a priori observable proxy for Tj and test whether it affects
offer premiums as our theory suggests it should. Continuing the notation from Section II.D, the
target bid premium is
VP j = B j + Tj ,

(24)

while, as in equation (18), the runup is VRj = πB j + Tj . Since both VRj and VP j include Tj , the
effect of Tj nets out in the markup: VP j − VRj = (1 − π)B j . Substituting these expressions into
the markup projection (4) and rearranging yields

VP j =

1
(VRj − Tj ) + Tj .
π

(25)

Equation (25) is stated in terms of the observable offer premium and the runup. It indicates
that the net runup VRj − Tj should be unrelated to a proxy for Tj , so the one-for-one relation
between the offer premium and the proxy for Tj should hold in a univariate setting.12 We
therefore examine equation (25) using the linear regressions reported in Table IX.
Candidate proxies for Tj considered in this section include factors that affect the offer premium through the target market value but are uncorrelated with takeover likelihood. Candidates
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are the cumulative market return over the runup period, a CAPM benchmark (beta times the
market return), or the target industry return. All of these are subject to their own varying
degrees of measurement error. We select perhaps the simplest measure, the market return during the runup period or M arket runup. As it turns out, more complex measures such as the
market-adjusted industry return over the runup period do not add explanatory power to the
regressions reported in Table IX.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table IX show that Net runup is linearly related to Market runup.
Since our theory predicts that these two variables should be uncorrelated, we use Whitened net
runup in the premium regressions, where Whitened net runup is the unstandardized residuals
from a regression of Net runup on Market runup.
As expected from equation (25), columns (3) to (6) show that the coefficient on M arket runup
is highly significant and close to unity in all four offer premium regressions. This is evidence that
merger negotiations allow the market-driven portion of the target return to flow through to the
target in the form of a higher offer premium—on virtually a one-to-one basis. Also as expected,
the variable W hitened net runup is highly significant when included as an explanatory variable
for the offer premium. Inclusion of W hitened net runup substantially increases the regression
R2 (from approximately 8% to 34%) without significantly altering the size of the coefficient on
M arket runup.
The offer premium regressions also show that premiums are decreasing in T arget size and in
52-week high, both of which are highly significant. The significance of 52-week high for our offer
premiums is consistent with the recent findings of Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012). Moreover,
offer premiums are higher for tender offers and when the acquirer is publicly traded. The greater
offer premiums paid by public over private bidders is also reported by Bargeron et al. (2008).

V. Conclusion
We investigate whether pre-bid target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs—an
issue of first-order importance for the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. We base our predic-
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tions on a simple model with rational market participants and synergistic takeovers. Takeover
signals (rumors) received by the market cause market anticipation of deal synergies that drive
stock price runups. The model delivers the equilibrium pricing relation between the runup and
the subsequent offer price markup (the surprise effect of the bid announcement) that should
exist in a sample of observed bids.
A key model innovation is to allow the takeover signal to inform investors about potential
takeover synergies, so that a stronger signal implies higher expected synergies and deal values.
While this type of signal seems reasonable, it creates a runup-markup relation that is more
complex than previously thought. Specifically, in settings where offer prices do not respond
to runups, runups are conventionally though to be offset dollar-for-dollar by a decrease in the
markup. We show that this prediction presumes that the takeover signal is uninformative about
deal synergies. The runup-markup relation with our more informative takeover signal is always
greater than minus one-for-one and is inherently nonlinear, which our large-sample evidence
supports.
We next add a costly feedback loop from runups to offer premiums to the model. In this
loop, merger negotiations cause the bidder to transfer the runup to the target although the runup
is driven by market anticipation of target deal synergies—the bidder effectively pays twice for
anticipated target deal synergies embedded in the runup. Importantly, the costly feedback loop
implies a strictly positive relation between runups and markups, a prediction that our empirical
analysis rejects.
This empirical conclusion is robust to the method used to estimate runups and markups. In
particular, adjusting target runups for an unbiased estimate of target stand-alone value changes
over the runup period only strengthens the rejection. Our evidence therefore presents a strong
rejection of the notion that runups increase bidder takeover costs: specifically, bidders do not
pay twice for anticipated deal synergies embedded in runups.
A further perspective on the presence of deal anticipation in runups is provided by studying bidder returns. In our model, bidders act rationally and share in the takeover synergies.
This implies that, when the market anticipates a synergistic takeover and target runups do not
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increase the offer premium, bidder gains will be increasing in both the target runup and total
target gains. This prediction is a direct implication of our assumption that the takeover signal informs investors about conditional deal values in addition to takeover probabilities. The
empirical evidence strongly supports this prediction, which in and of itself contributes to the
ongoing debate over the existence of bidder takeover gains but also lends support to the basic
information structure underpinning our theoretical analysis.
Finally, we examine direct effects on the offer premium of exogenous shocks to the target
stock price during the runup period. We show that block trades in the target, including bidder
toehold purchases, tend to fuel target runups without increasing offer premiums (if anything,
premiums are lower in bids where those trades occur). Moreover, the market return over the
runup period is found to flow through to target shareholders by an almost dollar-for-dollar
increase in the offer premium. This type of flow-through is reasonable as it does not increase
bidder takeover costs.
What if, contrary to our model, the market were to systematically ignore the information
in takeover signals (a type of market inefficiency)? This alternative hypothesis implies that
markups will be independent of runups. Since our empirical tests strongly reject a zero linear
slope in the projection of markups on runups, and confirm that the projection is nonlinear, this
alternative market inefficiency hypothesis is rejected.
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Appendix: Valuation Functions with Uniform Uncertainty
Figure 2 plots target valuation functions with uniform uncertainty: G(S|s) ∼ U (s−∆, s+∆)
and g(S|s) = 1/(2∆) with ∆ = 4. Moreover, in the figure, bidding costs are C = 0.5 and the
synergy sharing rule is θ = 0.5, so the threshold synergy value for a rational bidder to make an
offer is K = C/θ = 1. Bids are possible but uncertain (0 < π < 1) for K − ∆ < s < K + ∆. The
bid probability π and the valuation functions VP = VR /π, VR , and VP − VR are, respectively,
Z

s+∆

g(S|s)dS = (s + ∆ − K)/(2∆),

π=

(A1)

K

Z

1
VP =
π

s+∆

(1 − θ)Sg(S|s)dS =
K

VR = πVP =
VP − VR =

1−θ
(s + ∆ + K),
2

1−θ
((s + ∆)2 − K 2 ),
4∆
1−θ
((K + ∆)2 − s2 ).
4∆

(A2)
(A3)
(A4)

The derivatives with respect to s are
dVP
1−θ
=
,
ds
2

dVR
(1 − θ)(s + ∆)
=
,
ds
2∆

and

d(VP − VR )
(1 − θ)s
=−
,
ds
2∆

(A5)

and so
d(VP − VR )/ds
s
=−
,
dVR /ds
s+∆

(A6)

which is the change in the slope of the markup projection, equation (4), as s changes. For a
given ∆ > 0, this slope is always greater than −1. The second derivative of this slope can be
written as


d2 (VP − VR )
ds d d(VP − VR )
=
.
dVR ds
dVR
dVR2

(A7)

Since, by assumption, dVR /ds > 0 (and the inverse ds/dVR > 0), it follows that

sign

d2 (VP − VR )
dVR2




= sign
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d d(VP − VR )
.
ds
dVR

(A8)

The sign is negative because the derivative of (A6) with respect to s is −∆/(s + ∆)2 < 0. This
proves that the markup projection shown in Figure 2, Panel B with uniform uncertainty reaches
a maximum (for s = 0).

36

Footnotes
1

With the costly feedback loop, the markup consists of the surprise target deal value (as before)

plus the surprise runup transfer, which sum to the total deal value. Details are in Section I.B
below.
2

Large classes of distributions including the normal, lognormal, and uniform distributions have

these implications for an upward shift in mean. See, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994), chapter 1, for a discussion of univariate stochastic orders.
3

If we instead assume a normal distribution for S|s in Figure 2, Panel A, π would never reach

one and the markup would remain strictly positive over the range of feasible bids.
4

With uniform uncertainty, high bid costs can create an environment where observed bids only

exist on the downward-sloping relation between markup and runup. For example, this happens
in Figure 2, Panel A when K > ∆ as bids are then feasible for positive signal values only.
However, this special case appears to be driven by the bounded nature of uniform uncertainty.
When S|s has a normal distribution, our examples invariably show an upward-sloping relation
between markup and runup at low signals, followed by a downward-sloping relation, irrespective
of bid costs.
5

To illustrate, the runup is now VRT = πE(B(S) + T |s, bid) + (1 − π)T = VR + T, where the

subscript T indicates the case with a stand-alone value change. Likewise, VP T = VP + T, and
so the markup projection with a target stand-alone value change is

VP − VR =

1−π
(VRT − T ),
π

which indicates that while observed markups already net out T in the data, T must be estimated
to isolate VR = VRT − T in observed runups. We develop an empirical estimator for T in Section
II.D below.
6

Since VR is monotonic in s, it has an inverse and so
d(VP − VR )
d(VP − VR ) ds
=(
)(
)=
dVR
ds
dVR
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d
ds (VP − VR )
d
ds VR

=

d
ds (1 − π)VP
d
ds πVP

.

7

Interestingly, the empirical results below suggest that actual bidding costs may be sufficiently

low to produce an internal maximum for the markup projection, as Figure 2, Panel B illustrates.
∗

∗

8

VP∗ − VR∗ = (1 − π)VP∗ = (1 − π ∗ )B + (1 − π ∗ )VR∗ = B , where the last equality uses (9).

9

This second alternative hypothesis also implies a negative correlation between νP and VP if

higher transfers from bidders are what drive target gains and not variation in merger synergy
gains.
10

These conclusions are unchanged if we restrict the sample to the 5,035 sample targets that

actually succeeded (the unconditional success probability is 5,035/6,150=0.82).
11

The statistical inferences are similar when we estimate Table VII using the subsample of

all-cash offers only.
12

In the case in which premiums are not increased with changes in stand-alone value, premiums

and proxies for changes in stand-alone value should be uncorrelated while the net markup should
be negatively correlated with proxies for changes in stand-alone value.
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Initial bid event: day -1 to +1.
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Figure 1. Percent average target runup, markup, and total offer premium in event time. This figure
plots the percent average cumulative target abnormal (market risk-adjusted) stock return (CAR) over the runup
period (trading day -41 through day -2) and over the announcement period (day -1 through day 1), and the average
total initial offer premium pOP
− 1, where OP is the initial offer price and p−42 is the target closing price on day
−42
-42. The sample comprises 6,150 U.S. public targets over the 1980 to 2008 period.
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Revision in target valuation

Panel A: Target valuation changes with uniform uncertainty

Target deal value: VP
Target runup: VR

Target markup: VP-VR

(1-θ)K

π(s) = 1

K-Δ

0
Synergy signal s in the runup period

K+Δ

Panel B: Markup projection: VP-VR=[(1-π)/π]VR with uniform and normal uncertainty
Maximum at
synergy signal s=0

Markup VP - VR

Theoretical fit with
uniform uncertainty

Theoretical fit with
normal uncertainty

π(s) = 1
(uniform uncertainty)
π(s) → 1
(normal uncertainty)

0

Target runup VR

Figure 2. Target valuations and markup projection without costly feedback loop. This figure plots target
valuations (Panel A) and markup projection (Panel B) without costly feedback loop. The market receives a signal s
(horizontal axis in Panel A) about a potential takeover with synergy S, where S|s ∼ U (s − ∆, s + ∆) and ∆ = 4.
The synergy sharing rule is θ = 0.5, and bid costs are C = 0.5 (paid here by the bidder). VR is the target runup,
VP is the market’s assessment of the target deal value conditional on both s and a bid, VP − VR is the markup,
and π = P rob(S ≥ K) is the probability of a takeover bid, where K = C/θ is the bid threshold for bidder gains
to be positive and π = 1 for s ≥ K + ∆. The solid curve in Panel B is the corresponding markup projection (see
the Appendix for the functional forms), while the broken curve in Panel B is the markup projection with a normal
distribution for S|s.
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Revisions in target valuations

0.6

Target deal value: VP*
0.5
0.4

π*(s)

Target markup: VP* ‐ VR*
0.3
0.2

Target runup: VR*
0
K*-Δ

K+Δ
Synergy signal s in the runup period

0.1

Probability of bid with transfer of runup to target

Panel A: Target valuation changes with transfer of runup to target

0

Markup VP* - VR*

Panel B: Projection of Vp*-VR* on VR* with transfer of runup to target

0

Target runup VR*

Figure 3. Target valuations and markup projection with costly feedback loop This figure plots target
valuations (Panel A) and markup projection (Panel B) with costly feedback loop. The market receives a signal s
(horizontal axis in Panel A) about a potential takeover with synergy S, where S|s ∼ U (s − ∆, s + ∆) and ∆ = 4. The
synergy sharing rule is θ = 0.5, and bid costs are C = 0.5 (paid here by the bidder). The bidder raises the offer price
by the target runup VR∗ (a costly feedback loop), which lowers the takeover probability π ∗ relative to π in Figure 2.
π ∗ (the right-side vertical axis of Panel A) converges to θ. Panel B shows the corresponding markup projection (see
the Appendix for the functional forms).
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Panel A: Markup projection using total runup

Best monotone fit

0.7

Best fit of 0.6
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Panel B: Markup projection using runup adjusted for target stand-alone value change
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Adjusted runup from day -42 to day -2
Figure 4. Markup projections estimated using offer prices. This figure plots markup projections estimated
using offer prices. The total markup is (OP/P−2 ) − 1, where OP is the offer price and P−2 is the target closing price
on day -2 relative to the first offer announcement date (day 0). In Panel A, the total runup is (P−2 /P−42 ) − 1. In
Panel B, the adjusted runup is the total runup in Panel A minus the BLUE estimate (equation (19)) of the target’s
stand-alone value change T over the runup period. For expositional purposes, Panel B plots the functions using the
middle 98% of the adjusted runups. All forms are estimated using the beta function, equation (17). The sample
comprises 6,146 bids over the 1980 to 2008 period.
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Markup CAR(-1,1)

0.35

0.3

Best fit of
flexible form
0.25

Best linear fit of
flexible form

Best monotone fit of
flexible form

0.2

‐0.06

0.15
‐0.01

0.04

0.09

0.14

0.19

Adjusted CAR runup from day -42 to day -2

Figure 5. Markup projection estimated using target cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). This figure
plots the markup projection estimated using target CAR. The markup is target CAR(-1,1) relative to the day of the
first offer announcement (day 0). The runup is CAR(-41,-2) adjusted for the target’s stand-alone value change T
over the runup period, using the BLUE estimator in equation (19). Abnormal stock returns are estimated using the
market model. For expositional purposes, the figure plots the functions over the middle 98% of the adjusted runups.
All forms are estimated using the beta function, equation (17). The sample comprises 6,146 bids over the 1980 to
2008 period.
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Panel A: Total bidder gains on target CAR runups

0.2

Bidder CAR(-41,1)

0.3

Best linear fit

0.1

0
‐0.5

‐0.3

‐0.1

0.1

0.3

0.5

‐0.1

Best fit of
flexible form
‐0.2

Target CAR(-41 ,-2)
Panel B: Total bidder gains on adjusted target CAR runups
0.1

Best linear fit
0.05

0
‐0.08

‐0.03

0.02

0.07

0.12

0.17

‐0.05

Best fit of
flexible form

‐0.15

‐0.2

Bidder CAR(-41,1)

‐0.1

Target adjusted CAR(-41,-2)

Figure 6. Projections of total bidder gains on target runups using CAR. This figure plots projections of
bidder gains on target runups using CAR. Bidder takeover gains are bidder cumulative abnormal stock returns from
the beginning of the runup period and through the day after the bid announcement, BCAR(-41,1). The target runup
is the target CAR(-41,-2). Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model, while the forms shown in the
figure are estimated using equation (17). For expositional purposes, the figure plots the functions over the middle
98% of the adjusted runups. A likelihood ratio (goodness-of-fit) test rejects linearity in favor of the nonlinear form
in the data. The sample comprises 3,689 public bidders over the 1980 to 2008 period.
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Table I
Summary of Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Tests
This table provides a summary of the theoretical predictions and empirical tests of Propositions 1 to 3. VP is the
market’s valuation of the target synergy gains B conditional on the takeover bid (the target deal value), VR is the
target runup, VP −VR is the offer markup, and A is the bidder synergy gains net of bidding costs. For convenience,
VR and VP are used to denote both the theoretical and the empirical values (although only the empirical values
may include a target stand-alone value change during the runup period). Λ(VR ) is a nonlinear transformation
of VR using the beta function (equation (17)). The cross-sectional estimation also includes a number of control
variables not shown here (defined in Table V).
Economic model

Econometric model

Empirical Tests

Proposition 1: Markup projection with rational deal anticipation and no feedback loop
VP − VR =

1−π
VR
π

VP − VR = a + bΛ(VR ) + e

Linear slope b strictly greater than −1
Goodness-of-fit tests for nonlinearity
Correction of VR for a change in target’s
stand-alone value T

Proposition 2: Markup projection with rational deal anticipation and costly feedback loop
VP∗ − VR∗ = E ∗ (B(S)|s, bid)

VP − VR = a + bVR + e

Slope b is positive everywhere: b > 0

Proposition 3: Deal anticipation and relation between bidder and target gains
Cov(A, B) > 0

νP = a + bVP + e

b > 0, where νP is an estimate of A

Cov(A, VR ) > 0

νP = a + bVR + e

b>0
b = 0 if dVP /ds = 0 and no costly feedback loop
b < 0 if dVP /ds = 0 with costly feedback loop

Auxiliary hypotheses—effects of shocks to target runup on offer premium
Toehold purchases are costly

VR = a + bα + e

Toehold purchase of α fuels runup: b > 0

VP = a + bVR + cα + e

Costly feedback: b, c > 0

Pass-through of market return VP = a + b(VR − RM ) + cRM + e b, c > 0, where RM is market return
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Table II
Sample Selection
This table provides a description of the sample selection process. An initial bid is the first control bid for the
target in 126 trading days (six months). Bids are grouped into takeover contests, which end when there are no
new control bids for the target in 126 trading days. All stock prices pi are adjusted for splits and dividends, where
i is the trading day relative to the announcement date (day 0).

Selection criteria

Source

All initial control bids in SDC (FORMC = M, AM) for U.S. public targets
during the period 1/1980 to 12/2008

SDC

Bidder owns <50% of the target shares at the time of the bid

SDC

Target firm has at least 100 days of common stock returns
in CRSP over the estimation period (day -297 to -43)
and is listed on NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ

Number of
exclusions

Sample
size

13,893
46

13,847

CRSP

4,138

9,109

Deal value > $10 million

SDC

1,816

7,293

Target stock price on day -42 > $1

CRSP

191

7,102

Offer price available

SDC

239

6,863

Target stock price on day -2 available

CRSP

6

6,857

Target announcement returns [-1,1] available

CRSP

119

6,738

Information on outcome and ending date of contest available

SDC

324

6,414

Contest shorter than 252 trading days

SDC

264

6,150

Final sample

6,150
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Table III
Annual Distribution of the Initial Offer Premium, Total Markup, and Total Runup
This table shows the mean and median offer premium, markup, target stock price runup and net runup for the
sample of 6,150 initial control bids for U.S. publicly traded target firms over the 1980 to 2008 period. The premium
is (OP/P−42 ) − 1, where OP is the price per share offered by the initial control bidder and Pi is the target stock
price on trading day i relative to the takeover announcement date (i = 0), adjusted for splits and dividends. The
total markup is (OP/P−2 )−1, the total runup is (P−2 /P−42 )−1, and the net runup is (P−2 /P−42 )−(M−2 /M−42 ),
where Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i.

Year

Sample
size
N

Offer premium
OP
−1
P−42
mean
median

Total markup
OP
−1
P−2
mean
median

Total runup
P−2
−1
P−42
mean
median

Net runup
M−2
− M−42
mean
median

1980

10

0.70

0.69

0.53

0.34

0.15

0.19

0.10

0.12

1981

35

0.60

0.48

0.40

0.36

0.15

0.13

0.16

0.14

1982

48

0.53

0.48

0.34

0.32

0.15

0.10

0.13

0.09

1983

58

0.49

0.50

0.33

0.35

0.12

0.12

0.10

0.08

1984

115

0.51

0.43

0.45

0.32

0.07

0.05

0.06

0.06

1985

161

0.40

0.34

0.26

0.22

0.11

0.10

0.08

0.06

1986

209

0.40

0.36

0.26

0.23

0.12

0.09

0.08

0.06

1987

202

0.39

0.36

0.32

0.25

0.07

0.07

0.06

0.03

1988

270

0.56

0.47

0.35

0.29

0.15

0.10

0.12

0.08

1989

194

0.54

0.43

0.39

0.30

0.11

0.07

0.07

0.03

1990

103

0.53

0.49

0.49

0.41

0.05

-0.00

0.05

-0.01

1991

91

0.55

0.46

0.40

0.33

0.12

0.09

0.08

0.05

1992

106

0.57

0.51

0.40

0.35

0.13

0.08

0.11

0.08

1993

146

0.48

0.43

0.36

0.33

0.10

0.07

0.08

0.05

1994

228

0.44

0.42

0.34

0.31

0.08

0.07

0.07

0.07

1995

290

0.47

0.39

0.33

0.27

0.11

0.09

0.06

0.04

1996

319

0.40

0.37

0.27

0.24

0.11

0.07

0.07

0.04

1997

434

0.41

0.38

0.26

0.23

0.13

0.12

0.09

0.08

1998

465

0.46

0.37

0.37

0.26

0.08

0.07

0.05

0.03

1999

496

0.55

0.45

0.37

0.30

0.15

0.11

0.12

0.08

2000

415

0.53

0.45

0.38

0.34

0.13

0.06

0.12

0.08

2001

270

0.55

0.46

0.40

0.34

0.11

0.08

0.12

0.09

2002

154

0.52

0.36

0.42

0.32

0.09

0.03

0.12

0.06

2003

189

0.47

0.34

0.30

0.23

0.13

0.08

0.09

0.05

2004

195

0.30

0.26

0.24

0.21

0.06

0.04

0.03

0.02

2005

230

0.30

0.27

0.25

0.21

0.05

0.04

0.04

0.03

2006

258

0.31

0.27

0.25

0.21

0.05

0.03

0.03

0.02

2007

284

0.31

0.28

0.29

0.23

0.02

0.02

0.00

0.00

2008

175

0.34

0.30

0.40

0.34

-0.04

-0.04

0.01

0.00

Total

6,150

0.45

0.38

0.33

0.27

0.10

0.07

0.08

0.05
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P−2
P−42

Table IV
Empirical Projections of Markups on Runups
This table shows the coefficient estimates in empirical projections of markups on runups. VRj is the runup and
VP j − VRj is the markup of the j 0 th target. The projection is
VP j − VRj = a + b

(VRj − min)(v−1) (max − VRj )w−1
+ j ,
Λ(v, w)(max − min)v+w−1

j = 1, ..., N,

where Λ(v, w) is the beta distribution with shape parameters v and w, max and min are the maximum and
minimum VR in the data, respectively, a is an overall intercept, b is a scale parameter, and j is a residual error
term. When constraining the shape to be linear, the projection delivers OLS estimates of a and b, which are
reported below. The reported t-statistics are for b = 0. LR is the likelihood ratio test statistic, distributed χ2 (d).
LR1 tests nonlinearity against linearity (d = 2, 1% critical value 9.2). LR2 tests monotonicity against linearity
(d = 1, critical value 6.6). LR3 ≡ LR1 − LR2 tests nonlinearity against monotonicity (d = 1, critical value 6.6).
The sample comprises 6,150 initial control bids for U.S. public targets over the 1980 to 2008 period.
Markup measure
VP − VR

Runup measure
VR

Linear projection

LR1

LR2

LR3

(1)
N=6,150

Total markup
OP
−1
P

Total runup
P−2
−1
P

a = 0.36
b = −0.24 (t = −11.9)

98.1
(p<0.001)

38.4
(p<0.001)

59.7
(p<0.001)

(2)
N=6,146

Total markup
OP
−1
P

Adjusted runupa
(1 − β)VR + βE(VR )

a = 0.43
b = −1.01 (t = −11.9)

125.6
(p<0.001)

64.5
(p<0.001)

61.1
(p<0.001)

(3)
N=6,150

Market modelb
CAR(−1, 1)

Market modelb
CAR(−41, −2)

a = 0.22
b = −0.09 (t = −6.7)

18.6
(p<0.001)

16.8
(p<0.001)

1.8
(p=0.180)

(4)
N=6,146

Market Modelb
CAR(−1, 1)

Adjusted runupa,b
CAR(−41, −2)

a = 0.24
b = −0.39 (t = −6.7)

33.3
(p<0.001)

32.68
(p<0.001)

0.8
(p=0.377)

(5)
N=6,103

Expected markupc
π( POP − 1)

Total runup
P−2
−1
P

a = 0.31
b = −0.17 (t = −9.5)

137.1
(p<0.001)

62.2
(p<0.001)

74.9
(p<0.001)

(6)
N=6,099

Expected markupc
π( POP − 1)

Adjusted runupa
(1 − β)VR + βE(VR )

a = 0.36
b = −0.75 (t = −9.4)

194.0
(p<0.001)

123.6
(p<0.001)

70.4
(p<0.001)

(7)
N=6,099

Residual markupd
UP

Augmented runupe
P
( P −2 − 1) + R0

a = 0.36
b = −0.26 (t = −12.1)

225.9
(p<0.001)

89.8
(p<0.001)

136.1
(p<0.001)

−2

−2

−2

−2

−42

−42

−42

a

This projection uses the runup adjusted for the cross-sectional variation in target stand-alone value (equation (21) in the
text). VR is the total runup in model (1), and the average β used to adjust VR is 0.77, with a max (min) of 0.99 (0.74).
See the text for details of the estimation of adjustment parameter β.
b Target CAR are computed using the estimated market model parameters: r
it = αi + βi rmt + uit , where rit and rmt
are the daily returns on stock i and the value-weighted market portfolio, and uit is a residual error term. The estimation
period is from day -297 to day -43 relative to the day of the announcement of the initial bid.
c This projection is for the subsample with available data on the target, bidder and deal characteristics used to estimate
the probability π of bid success in Table VI. The projection includes the effect of these variables by multiplying the total
markup by the estimated value of π.
d Residual markup, U , is the residual from the projection of the total markup, OP − 1, on the deal characteristics used
P
P−2
to estimate the success probability π in Table VI, excluding P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and 52-week high, which are
used to construct the augmented runup. Variable definitions are in Table V.
e The enhancement R in the augmented runup adds back to the runup the effect of information that the market might
0
P
use to anticipate possible takeover activity prior to the runup period. R0 is the projection of the total runup ( P −2 − 1)
−42
on the deal characteristics P ositive toehold, T oehold size, and the negative value of 52-week high, all of which may affect
the prior probability of a takeover (prior to the runup period). The augmented runup is the total runup plus R0 . Variable
definitions are in Table V.
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Table V
Variable Definitions
This table provides definitions of the variables used in the analyses. All stock prices Pi are adjusted for splits and
dividends, where i is the trading day relative to the date of announcement (i = 0), and, if missing, replaced by
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread.
Variable

Definition

Source

Target characteristics
Target size

Natural logarithm of the target market capitalization in $ billion on day -42

Relative size

Ratio of target market capitalization to bidder market capitalization on day -42 CRSP

NYSE/Amex

The target is listed on NYSE or Amex vs. NASDAQ (dummy)

Turnover

Average daily ratio of trading volume to total shares outstanding over the 52 CRSP
weeks ending on day -43
The target has a poison pill (dummy)
SDC

Poison pill
52-week high

CRSP
CRSP

Change in the target stock price from the highest price Phigh over the 52 weeks CRSP
ending on day -43, P−42 /Phigh − 1

Bidder characteristics
Toehold

The acquirer owns shares in the target when announcing the bid (dummy)

SDC

Toehold size

Percent target shares owned by the acquirer when announcing the bid

SDC

Stake bidder

The initial bidder buys a small equity stake in the target during the runup SDC
period through day 0 (dummy)
Another investor buys a small equity stake in the target during the runup period SDC
through day 0 (dummy)

Stake other

Acquirer public

The acquirer is publicly traded (dummy)

Horizontal

The bidder and the target have the same primary four-digit SIC code (dummy) SDC

SDC

>20% new equity

Consideration includes a stock portion that exceeds 20% of the acquirer’s shares SDC
outstanding (dummy)

Contest characteristics
Premium

Bid premium defined as (OP/P−42 ) − 1, where OP is the offer price

Net runup

Target net runup defined as (P−2 /P−42 ) − (M−2 /M−42 ), where Mi is the value CRSP
of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i

Market runup

Stock market return during the runup period defined as M−2 /M−42 − 1, where CRSP
Mi is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio on day i

SDC,CRSP

Whitened net runup The unstandardized residuals from a regression of the target net runup on mar- CRSP
ket runup
Tender offer

The initial bid is a tender offer (dummy)

SDC

All cash

Consideration is cash only (dummy)

SDC

All stock

Consideration is stock only (dummy)

SDC

Hostile

Target management’s response is hostile vs. friendly or neutral (dummy)

SDC

1990s

The contest is announced in the period 1990 to 1999 (dummy)

SDC

2000s

The contest is announced in the period 2000 to 2008 (dummy)

SDC
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Table VI
Logit Estimations of the Conditional Bid Success Probability
This table reports the parameter estimates in logit regressions for the probability that the contest is successful
(columns (1) and (2)), and for the probability that the initial control bidder wins (columns (3) to (6)). All variable
definitions are in Table V (p-values in parentheses). The sample comprises 6,103 initial control bids for public
U.S. targets with a complete set of control variables over the 1980 to 2008 period.
Dependent variable:

Contest successful

Initial control bidder wins

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1.047
(<0.001)

0.909
(<0.001)

0.657
(<0.001)

0.455
(0.005)

0.626
(<0.001)

0.437
(0.007)

T arget size

0.137
(<0.001)

0.085
(0.005)

0.148
(<0.001)

0.094
(0.001)

0.150
(<0.001)

0.096
(0.001)

N Y SE/Amex

-0.365
(<0.001)

-0.269
(0.005)

-0.435
(<0.001)

-0.330
(<0.001)

-0.433
(<0.001)

-0.329
(<0.001)

T urnover

-0.017
(0.002)

-0.019
(0.001)

-0.017
(0.002)

-0.019
(0.001)

-0.017
(0.003)

-0.019
(0.001)

P oison pill

-0.578
(0.028)

-0.513
(0.053)

-0.506
(0.063)

-0.436
(0.114)

-0.406
(0.138)

-0.341
(0.219)

1.022
(<0.001)

1.255
(<0.001)

0.864
(<0.001)

1.117
(<0.001)

0.868
(<0.001)

1.120
(<0.001)

-0.819
(<0.001)

-0.688
(<0.001)

-0.978
(<0.001)

-0.833
(<0.001)

-1.589
(<0.001)

-1.419
(<0.001)

0.039
(<0.001)

0.038
(<0.001)

Intercept
Target characteristics

52-week high
Bidder characteristics
T oehold
T oehold size
Acquirer public

0.833
(<0.001)

0.804
(<0.001)

0.938
(<0.001)

0.900
(<0.001)

0.952
(<0.001)

0.915
(<0.001)

0.248
(0.020)

0.211
(0.050)

0.276
(0.006)

0.226
(0.025)

0.281
(0.005)

0.232
(0.022)

-0.585
(<0.001)

-0.577
(<0.001)

-0.531
(<0.001)

-0.522
(<0.001)

-0.536
(<0.001)

-0.526
(<0.001)

0.343
(0.001)

0.371
(<0.001)

0.334
(0.001)

0.365
(<0.001)

0.350
(<0.001)

0.380
(<0.001)

2.173
(<0.001)

2.307
(<0.001)

1.912
(<0.001)

2.053
(<0.001)

1.945
(<0.001)

2.085
(<0.001)

All cash

-0.148
(0.119)

-0.276
(0.005)

-0.105
(0.236)

-0.224
(0.014)

-0.114
(0.199)

-0.236
(0.010)

Hostile

-2.264
(<0.001)

-2.149
(<0.001)

-3.086
(<0.001)

-2.980
(<0.001)

-2.994
(<0.001)

-2.893
(<0.001)

Horizontal
> 20% new equity
P remium
Deal characteristics
T ender of f er

1990s

0.435
(<0.001)

0.566
(<0.001)

0.548
(<0.001)

2000s

0.775
(<0.001)

0.824
(<0.001)

0.816
(<0.001)

Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke)

0.208

0.219

0.263

0.276

0.269

0.281

χ2

755.1

795.8

1074.0

1129.3

1098.5

1151.8
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Table VII
Regressions of Bidder Takeover Gains on Target Total Gains and Target Runup
This table reports OLS parameter estimates in linear cross-sectional regressions with bidder CAR over trading
days -41 to 1 as the dependent variable. CAR is estimated using the market model estimated over trading days
-252 through -42 relative to the initial bid day. The variable T arget CAR(−41, 1) is total target gains. The target
runup is measured three ways: T arget CAR(−41, −2), T arget adjusted CAR(−41, −2) (adjusted for the BLUE
estimator for target stand-alone value changes in equation (21) in the text), and N et target runup (computed
P−2
M−2
as P−42
− M−42
, where M is the value of the equal-weighted market portfolio. The p-values (in parentheses)
use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The sample comprises 3,691 initial control
bids by U.S. public bidders over the 1980 to 2008 period. The control variables are (i) target characteristics:
Relative size, N Y SE/Amex, and T urnover; (ii) bidder characteristics: T oehold size and Horizontal; and (iii)
deal characteristics: All cash, All stock, and Hostile. See Table V for variable definitions.
Regression model
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Intercept

-0.036
(<0.001)

-0.032
(<0.001)

-0.019
(<0.001)

-0.016
(0.033)

-0.052
(<0.001)

-0.010
(0.209)

T arget CAR(−41, 1)

0.101
(<0.001)

0.099
(<0.001)
0.149
(<0.001)

0.147
(<0.001)

T arget CAR(−41, −2)

T arget adjusted CAR(−41, −2)

0.649
(<0.001)

N et target runup

1999-2000 indicator

Control variables
Adjusted-R2
F-value

Sample size, N

0.079
(<0.001)

-0.041
(<0.001)

-0.036
(<0.001)

-0.039
(<0.001)

-0.034
(<0.001)

-0.034
(<0.001)

-0.032
(<0.001)

no

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

0.036

0.056

0.040

0.061

0.062

0.038

41.6
(<0.001)

10.7
(<0.001)

39.6
(<0.001)

11.6
(<0.001)

11.7
(<0.001)

7.14
(<0.001)

3,691

3,624

3,691

3,624

3,620

3,623
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Table VIII
Description of Short-Term Toeholds Acquired by Bidders and Other Investors
This table reports toehold acquisitions made by the initial control bidder, a rival control bidder, and other
investors. Stake purchases are identified from records of completed partial acquisitions in SDC. The initial control
bid is announced on day 0. The sample comprises 6,150 initial control bids for U.S. publicly traded targets over
the 1980 to 2008 period.
Target stake
announced in window
[-126,0] [-42,0]

Total toehold
on day 0

[-1,0]

Toehold acquired by initial control bidder
Number of toehold purchases

136

Number of firms in which at least one stake is purchased

104

70

122

94

63

648

In percent of target firms

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

10.5%

Size of toehold (% of target shares) when toehold positive: mean
median

12.2%
9.9%

11.7%
9.3%

12.7%
9.4%

15.5%
9.9%

Number of toehold purchases

7

3

1

Number of firms in which at least one stake is purchased

6

3

1

In percent of target firms

0.1%

0.05%

0.02%

Size of toehold (% of target shares) when toehold positive: mean
median

9.4%
9.1%

7.0%
6.2%

4.9%
4.9%

Number of toehold purchases

235

85

18

Number of firms in which at least one stake is purchased

196

73

15

In percent of target firms

3.2%

1.2%

0.2%

Size of toehold (% of target shares) when toehold positive: mean
median

6.8%
5.4%

8.7%
6.3%

10.1%
7.6%

Toehold acquired by rival control bidder

n/a

Toehold acquired by other investor
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n/a

Table IX
Effects of Market Runup and Toehold Acquisition on Target Runup and Offer
Premium
This table shows coefficient estimates in OLS regressions with target net runup (columns (1) and (2)) and offer
premium (columns (3) to (6)) as dependent variables. All variable definitions are in Table V. The sample comprises
6,100 initial control bids for public U.S. targets with a complete set of control variables over the 1980 to 2008
period. (p-values in parentheses).
Dependent variable:

Intercept
M arket runup

Target net runup
M−2
P−2
− M−42
P−42

Offer premium
OP
−1
P−42

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.113
(<0.001)

0.276
(0.014)

0.616
(<0.001)

1.073
(<0.001)

0.573
(<0.001)

0.857
(<0.001)

0.101
0.029

0.120
0.015

0.924
(<0.001)

1.054
(<0.001)

0.933
(<0.001)

1.042
(<0.001)

1.077
(<0.001)

1.068
(<0.001)

W hitened net runup
Target characteristics
T arget size

-0.015
(<0.001)

-0.012
(<0.001)

-0.054
(<0.001)

-0.048
(<0.001)

-0.039
(<0.001)

-0.035
(<0.001)

N Y SE/Amex

0.006
(0.351)

0.003
(0.659)

0.017
(0.239)

0.011
(0.442)

0.010
(0.422)

0.008
(0.529)

T urnover

0.000
(0.815)

0.000
(0.934)

-0.001
(0.561)

0.000
(0.775)

0.001
(0.589)

0.000
(0.698)

-0.042
(<0.001)

-0.027
(0.026)

-0.214
(<0.001)

-0.175
(<0.001)

-0.169
(<0.001)

-0.146
(<0.001)

0.032
(<0.001)

0.032
(<0.001)

0.046
(0.001)

0.052
(<0.001)

0.012
(0.305)

0.018
(0.136)

Horizontal

-0.015
(0.036)

-0.013
(0.065)

-0.009
(0.536)

-0.002
(0.891)

0.007
(0.555)

0.012
(0.324)

T oehold size

-0.001
(0.002)

-0.002
(<0.001)

-0.003
(<0.001)

-0.004
(<0.001)

-0.002
(0.014)

-0.002
(0.004)

Stake bidder

0.050
(0.044)

0.056
(0.023)

-0.029
(0.560)

-0.012
(0.804)

-0.082
(0.051)

-0.072
(0.088)

Stake other

0.124
(<0.001)

0.125
(<0.001)

0.089
(0.100)

0.093
(0.084)

-0.044
(0.340)

-0.040
(0.382)

0.037
(<0.001)

0.028
(<0.001)

0.094
(<0.001)

0.076
(<0.001)

0.055
(<0.001)

0.046
(0.001)

All cash

-0.009
(0.207)

-0.001
(0.919)

-0.024
(0.112)

-0.002
(0.914)

-0.014
(0.278)

-0.001
(0.949)

All stock

0.002
(0.805)

0.000
(0.989)

-0.005
(0.755)

-0.008
(0.631)

-0.007
(0.600)

-0.008
(0.578)

Hostile

-0.009
(0.503)

-0.011
(0.423)

-0.005
(0.865)

-0.008
(0.773)

0.005
(0.825)

0.004
(0.874)

no

yes

no

yes

no

yes

0.026
12.5

0.039
6.85

0.077
37.4

0.092
15.7

0.339
209.2

0.346
76.0

52-week high
Bidder characteristics
Acquirer public

Deal characteristics
T ender of f er

Year fixed effects
Adjusted-R
F-value

2
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